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ABSTRACT. Times are changing as our global ecosystem for commercializing innovation helps
bring new technologies to market, networks grow, interconnections and transactions become
more complex around standards and otherwise, all to enable vast opportunities to improve the
human condition, to further competition, and to improve broad access. The policies that
governments use to structure their legal systems for intellectual property, especially patents, as
well as for competition—or antitrust—continue to have myriad powerful impacts and raise
intense debates over challenging questions. This Chapter explores a representative set of debates
about policy approaches to patents, to elucidate particular ideas to bear in mind about how
adopting a private law, property rights-based approach to patents enables them to better operate
as tools for facilitating the commercialization of new technologies in ways that best promote the
goals of increasing access while fostering competition and security for a diverse and inclusive
society.

KEYWORDS: Intellectual property, patents, competition, antitrust, trade, international trade,
security, national security, innovation, invention, 5G, internet of things, IoT, information,
communication, technology, standards, standard setting organizations, SSO, standard essential
patents, SEP, licensing, RAND, FRAND, PAE, patent troll.

*

Kieff is the Fred C. Stevenson Research Professor at the George Washington University Law School; and a
former Commissioner of the US International Trade Commission. Grant is a fellow at the Lauterpacht
Centre for International Law at the University of Cambridge; a former designee to the Permanent Court of
Arbitration (US National Group); and a former Senior Advisor for Strategic Planning in the Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation at the US Department of State. The views in this chapter are
those of the authors in their capacities as academics only and not necessarily those of their former agencies
in US government. The authors take no position on any particular pending or proposed legislative or other
governmental actions.

I.

INTRODUCTION

For many decades, the products and services provided for and from our information and
communication-related industries have required an ever-increasing number of technologies,
many of which are patented, often from many firms, and often across several national borders.
As the fifth generation (5G) of these communication tools get deployed, uses are enjoying vastly
improved performance. 5G use cases include a broad range of applications, from enhanced
mobile broadband for personal and autonomous communications, data-processing, and
entertainment devices, as well as massive levels of inter-machine communications needed for
smart factories and cities, to ultra-reliable and low-latency communications needed for
potentially dangerous high-speed activities like self-driving cars and remote surgery. In turn,
this is leading to newer uses and more complex interactions, such as those needed to support the
Internet of Things (IoT)—as when home appliances and cars are directly communicating with
each other, as distinct from the internet of devices that facilitate communications among humans,
like personal computers, tablets, and phones. IoT use cases include smart homes, smart cities,
telemedicine and telehealth, human and cyber security, building management, agriculture and
aquaculture management, green energy management, enhanced and remote monitoring and
control of vehicles and other physical assets. To achieve these applications, a vast number of
interactions and interconnections must take place, which in turn require immense transacting and
private ordering, including a great deal of standard setting.
Standards are the agreed-upon conventions that users of particular technologies follow to
facilitate interoperability, like driving on the right or left side of the road to improve traffic flow
and safety. Some standards are set informally through various coordination mechanisms,
including passive ones, while many are set formally through active engagement among many
participants in standard setting organizations or standard development organizations (SSOs or
SDOs). For 5G and IoT, standards are a significant part of the business ecosystem—such as
standards for how cellular modems—Wi-Fi radios, or electronic memory operate—as well as a
significant part of policy debates.
Early in the process of developing a given technology, an inventor might elect to seek patent
protection instead of trade secret protection and might seek to advertise the invention or even
encourage the development of standards to permit, require, or in some other way evolve to
increase the value of the inventor’s technology. Similarly, an implementer might, while totally
unaware of a particular invention, inventor, or even standard, invest heavily in some capital
expenditure, such as a multi-billion-dollar chip fabrication facility (“fab”), or set of commercial
relationships. Concurrently, other parties may be contracting with the inventor or implementer
to buy, sell, license, co-invest, co-develop, or co-deploy in any of the relevant asset markets,
including the markets for technologies, employees, equipment, investment, and corporate
control. Third parties are also making investment decisions along the way, often choosing to
remain third parties by designing around and avoiding either the inventor or the implementer and
their respective investments.
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A significant amount of subsequent time after an invention is made is almost always then also
involved, for two main reasons. One reason is that technological and business development are
inherently time-consuming, expensive, risky endeavors with a mix of first-mover and secondmover advantages. It can take up to a decade or longer for a new technology to be brought to
market in the form of, or as a component of, a particular product or service. Getting inventions
put to use by consumers or even businesses often takes a large amount of subsequent
development. Not many practical solutions—products or services—emerge fully developed and
perfected like the mythological Athena from the head of Zeus, as if necessity alone were the
instant mother of every invention and every end-use later developed for that invention.
The second reason is that nearly all modern patent systems are inherently premised on a
significant government examination of the patent application to make an evaluation of the formal
requirements of the patent application and a preliminary evaluation of the legal and technological
substantive requirements of the patent application.1 This process of patent prosecution by the
applicant and patent examination by the patent office often takes about three years, or much
longer. The major contributor to this time delay is the effort needed to get even a rough
assessment of the relevant technological field of art so that the patent law conditions of novelty,
nonobviousness, and disclosure can be assessed against the benchmark of the state of this prior
art.
While all of that time is passing and all of these many actors are taking their own steps
towards technology development, it is important to keep in mind that the patentees often will
have filed their patent applications before moving too far into the marketplace or allowing too
much time to lapse after inventing in part because modern patent systems have rules that strongly
encourage early filing; and in part because of what is often called the Arrow Information
Paradox. Named after Nobel-Prize-winning economist Kenneth Arrow,2 the gist of the paradox
is that it is hard to sell new information like an invention without giving potential buyers enough
of a taste for them to formulate their level of appetite for it. But if they have been shown enough
of it to really understand it, they wouldn’t need to pay to make use of it. Having a patent
application filed helps crack the paradox by making someone using technology that may become
patented into a potential infringer unless they strike a deal with the patentee for a sale or license
of the patent.
In the middle of all of this wondrous complexity, a day—or decade—in the life of a
commercial enterprise trying to implement a new technology can be viewed as quite hard. The
technological and business challenges are exacerbated by the legal risks flowing from the reality
that each issued patent gives its patentee a right—supported by the vibrant market for litigation
financing and intermediaries like patent assertion entities (PAEs), which are sometimes called
“patent trolls”—to threaten or actually bring various patent infringement lawsuits. These suits
1

For a thorough discourse of US patent law, including the rules and procedures for obtaining, transacting over, and
enforcing patents, see, generally, JOHN M. GOLDEN ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW (7th ed, 2018).
2
KENNETH J. ARROW, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (1962).
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may include civil litigation in district court to allege patent infringement. Those district court
actions typically seek damages, and these days in some cases also injunctions. Meanwhile,
another type of patent infringement suit can be brought asking the US International Trade
Commission to initiate an investigation that may lead to an order excluding the relevant articles
from entry into the US market. The billions of dollars and vast human capital spent building that
fab and those commercial relationships may be threatened, with each lawsuit or investigation
alleging patent infringement typically costing up to ten or more million dollars in legal fees and
associated expenses, often lasting five to seven years or longer in the case of district court
litigation. And all of that is before appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
and possible appeal from there to the U.S. Supreme Court. Even the mere threat or the mere
initiation of these types of patent infringement proceedings can cause turbulent waves in the
markets, whether they be the markets for the products the implementer wants to sell, the markets
for commercial collaborators, or the markets for finance and corporate control. Critics of patent
enforcement express great concern about the overall disruptive impact that patent enforcement
and its threat can have on large technology-implementing companies like those of Silicon Valley
fame.
But there is another side to the coin having implementers on one side and patentees on the
other. Disruptive too is a day—or decade—in the life of a patentee trying to commercialize a
patented invention. Implementers also have their own rights around patents owned by others,
which are also supported by the vibrant market for litigation financing, including to bring district
court litigation seeking a declaratory judgment that the patent is invalid—which involve similar
time and expense to those of infringement litigation—as well as to bring or help others bring a
plethora of post-grant review procedures in the patent office to cancel some or all of the claims
of an issued patent. As with the turbulent waves that implementers face from the mere threat or
initiation of infringement proceedings, patentees face similar market disruption from the mere
threat or initiation of invalidation or cancellation proceedings. Especially for small early-stage
ventures, this can cut off the vital access to financing that they need to even keep afloat as a
going concern.
A great amount and variety of coordination mechanisms must be used well for all of this to
occur relatively effectively and efficiently. In all of them, timing plays an important role,
because there is a great deal of path-dependency at stake, for almost everyone involved. One
common coordination tool used in these settings is to have the SSOs deploy various approaches
to facilitate the broad licensing of any patents that may be helpful or essential (so-called
standard-essential patents, or SEPs) to practice a given standard. One such approach is to require
parties to disclose pending patent applications, or to suggest which patents in a potentially large
population of candidates are truly most likely to be adjudicated, infringed, and not invalid in a
suit against those practicing the standard. Another such approach is to encourage or require that
patentees participating in the SSO must make a commitment to license their patents on
reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms or fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory
(FRAND) terms to those practicing the standard.
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It may seem that many of these complexities, coordination challenges and opportunities, or
risks or rewards is new, posing new questions calling for new policy responses. But that is not
the case. They have each long been studied by scholars of the history of the interface between
the patent and antitrust systems, in both the empirical economic literature and in the legal
literature.3 The upshot from the empirical economics literature is that a property rights approach
to patents focused on commercializing innovation facilitates competition and access. This
positive effect is evidenced by large decreases in quality-adjusted prices and steady ongoing
entry into even markets for information and communications technologies with large numbers of
patents and standards that are the focus of the debates about 5G and IoT.4 The upshot from the
legal literature, which is the focus of this chapter and explored in more detail below, is that the

3

For a sampling of this work see, e.g., Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly
Laws, 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 85, pts. 1–5, at 85, 159, 241, 328, 422 (1942) (broad legal exploration of the patent
antitrust interface from the first half of the last century by the person who became on the principal drafters of the
1952 Patent Act, which codified key approaches to that interface that remain only strengthened in the present
iteration of the statute, and who sat as a federal appellate judge interpreting that statute until the end of the century);
F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of Intellectual Property, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 174 (2004) (outlining how this approach to the patent antitrust interface facilitates commercialization and
competition when applied to a range of more modern doctrinal and policy debates); F. Scott Kieff, Quanta v. LG
Electronics: Frustrating Patent Deals by Taking Contracting Options off the Table?, 2007-2008 CATO S. CT. REV.
315 (2008) (showing how modern case law can frustrate these goals); F. SCOTT KIEFF & HENRY E. SMITH, How Not
to Invent a Patent Crisis, in REACTING TO THE SPENDING SPREE: POLICY CHANGES WE CAN AFFORD 55 (Terry
Anderson & Richard Sousa, eds., 2009); Richard A. Epstein et al., The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up
Replacing Private Coordination, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1 (2012) (same for approaches of modern antitrust
enforcement agencies); F. Scott Kieff, Private Antitrust at the U.S. International Trade Commission, 14 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 46 (2018) (elucidating how ITC enforcement would operate better); Adam Mossoff, The
Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165
(2011) (elucidating an infamous historical case); JONATHAN BARNETT, The Great Patent Grab, in THE BATTLE
OVER PATENTS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CURRENT DEBATES (Stephen Haber & Naomi Lamoreaux eds.,
2021) (chapter focusing on current debates in recent edited volume exploring the field); Stephen Haber & Naomi R.
Lamoreaux, The Battle Over Patents, Defining Ideas, HOOVER INST. (Nov. 3, 2021),
https://www.hoover.org/research/battle-over-patents (short essay reviewing the topic).
4
Alexander Galetovic et al., An Empirical Examination of Patent Holdup, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 549
(2015) (finding no evidence that SEP-reliant industries experience more stagnant quality-adjusted prices than nonSEP-reliant industries or that court decisions that reduce the excessive power of SEP holders accelerated innovation
in SEP-reliant industries); Stephen Haber, Patents and the Wealth of Nations, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 811 (2016)
(exploring the aggregate social value of property rights in patents); Stephen Haber & Seth Werfel, Patent Trolls as
Financial Intermediaries? Experimental Evidence, 149 ECON. LETTERS 64, 64 (2016) (“Our results indicate that
PAEs served an intermediary function for two groups in our sample: subjects who identified as inventors rather than
entrepreneurs, and subjects who were relatively more sensitive to financial losses”); Alexander Galetovic & Stephen
Haber, The Fallacies of Patent Holdup Theory, 13 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON 1 (2017) (showing serious flaws in
the basic logic of patent holdup theory making it logically inconsistent and incomplete and inconsistent with
economic fundamentals and evidence); Alexander Galetovic et al., An estimate of the average cumulative royalty
yield in the world mobile phone industry: Theory, measurement and results, 42 TELECOMM. POLICY 263 (2018)
(empirical evidence that the royalty stack for patents in the mobile phone industry is about 3-6 percent rather than
the 20-40 percent or higher estimated by critics of a property rights approach to patents); Alexander Galetovic et al.,
Is There an Anticommons Tragedy in the World Smartphone Industry?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1527 (2018)
(same); Alexander Galetovic & Stephen Haber, SEP Royalties: What Theory of Value and Distribution Should
Courts Apply?, 17 OHIO ST. TECH. L.J. 189 (2021) (showing how well it works to price patent royalties using a
common method that relies on information from the market about the value of comparable assets or their rental
rates).
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such a property rights approach to the patent system gives clear guidance about which choices to
make between particular versions of the detailed legal rules actually implemented across the
patent system, from those governing patent validity to those governing patent transactions and
patent enforcement. It is the different mechanisms of these different legal rules that enables
patents to be so helpful in facilitating the vital coordination needed for the commercialization of
new technologies.
II. PROPERTY APPROACH TO PATENTS
HAS SUPPORT ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM
Debates about patents have long focused on the patent-antitrust interface.5 Especially in this
context, the views offered about patents by antitrust enforcers6 have generally focused on the
role that IP in general and patents in particular can play on the one hand in providing beneficial
incentives to create or invent, and on the other hand in enabling harmful concentrations of
market power leading to increased prices and reduced output. Such discussions often then focus
essentially on how much of the “good” is enough, how much of the “bad” is too much, and
tradeoffs between them.
In effect, those discussions highlight a direct tension between IP as a helpful incentive to
create or invent and IP as the cause of deleterious anticompetitive monopoly effects. They then
offer various approaches to legal regimes to address both sides of the tension. One set of
approaches includes the use of other inducements or rewards for creation or invention in the
place of, or in addition to, IP, such as regulatory exclusivity, tax credits, grants, prizes, and the
like. A second set of approaches exempts particular fields of technology from eligibility for IP
protection, such as those having to do with healthcare, software, or finance, usually with the
expectation of significant, frequent, and ongoing updates to the boundaries of these exempted
fields. A third set of approaches decreases the remedies available for IP infringement, including
damages, injunctions, and exclusion orders. A fourth set of approaches directly addresses
interactions between IP owners and IP users, including heightened antitrust scrutiny, compulsory
5

The discussion in this section is drawn from Letter from F. Scott Kieff on Views of the Honorable F. Scott Kieff,
Commissioner, United States International Trade Commission, on the United Sates Federal Trade Commission’s and
the United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s Joint Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/897081/download; and F. Scott Kieff, Pragmatism,
Perspective, and Trade: AD/CVD, Patents, and Antitrust as Mostly Private Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 97 (2017).
6
Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components Thereof, USITC Investigation No. 337-TA-613 (Remand), Reply
Submission on the Public Interest of Federal Trade Commissioners Maureen K. Ohlhausen and Joshua D. Wright
(July 20, 2015); Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components Thereof, USITC Investigation No. 337-TA-613
(Remand), Written Submission on the Public Interest of Federal Trade Commission Chairwoman Edith Ramirez
(July 13, 2015); Correspondence from United States Federal Trade Commission Chairwoman Edith Ramirez to
United States Trade Representative Michael Froman (July 15, 2013); Certain Wireless Communication Devices,
Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, Computers and Components Thereof, USITC Investigation No. 337TA-745, Third Party United States Federal Trade Commission’s Statement on the Public Interest (June 6, 2012);
Certain Gaming and Entertainment Consoles, Related Software, and Components Thereof, USITC Investigation No.
337-TA-752, Third Party United States Federal Trade Commission’s Statement on the Public Interest (June 6,
2012).
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licenses, and governmental takings of IP licenses or the entire IP rights themselves. Many other
ideas are also offered.
A common theme across these approaches is to view IP more in the tradition of public law, or
as regulatory entitlements, by focusing on the use of more extensive interactions between
governmental bodies and private parties. The overarching goals across different perspectives in
the literature are generally shared and laudatory: fostering access to creative or inventive
technologies, competition, economic growth, and diverse and inclusive participation; improving
both efficiency and fairness for all.
These shared goals also are championed by an intellectual approach to IP that is different than
those briefly mentioned above. This different approach—a commercialization approach—has
been embraced across the American political spectrum, including both the Carter administration
and the Reagan administration,7 as well as by celebrated jurists of the last century coming from
diverse philosophical perspectives, including Circuit Judges Learned Hand, Jerome Frank, and
Giles Rich,8 who saw it as important to helping the economy and society.9 The roots of a
commercialization approach to patents, in particular, reach back even further into American
history, including Abraham Lincoln’s view that the patent system “added the fuel of interest to
the fire of genius, in the discovery and production of new and useful things.”10
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Judge Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U.L. REV. 821 (2005).
Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 159
(1942), reprinted in 14 FED. CIR. B.J. at pages 5, 21, 37, 67, and 87 (2004-5) (five-part series of articles); Picard v.
United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., concurring); Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501,
503 (2d Cir. 1960) (Hand, J.) (noting “[t]here can be no doubt that the Act of 1952 meant to change the slow but
steady drift of judicial decision that had been hostile to patents”); Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d
530, 536-37 (2d Cir. 1955) (Hand, J.) (noting “§ 103. . . restores the original gloss . . . [A] legislature . . . must be
free to reinstate the courts’ initial interpretation, even though it may have been obscured by a series of later
comments whose upshot is at best hazy.”).
9
Some representative examples in the literature that are consistent with commercialization approach include the
following: Stephen Haber, Patents and the Wealth of Nations, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 811 (2016); Alexander
Galetovic et al., An Empirical Examination of Patent Holdup, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 549 (2015); Daniel F.
Spulber, How Patents Provide the Foundation of the Market for Inventions, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 271
(2015); Pierre Larouche et al., Settling FRAND Disputes: Is Mandatory Arbitration a Reasonable and
Nondiscriminatory Alternative?, 10 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581 (2014); F. Scott Kieff & Anne Layne-Farrar,
Incentive Effects from Different Approaches to Holdup Mitigation Surrounding Patent Remedies and StandardSetting Organizations, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1091 (2013); Richard A. Epstein et al., The FTC, IP, and
SSOs: Government Hold-Up Replacing Private Coordination, supra note 3, at 1; Mark P. Gergen et al., The
Supreme Court's Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203 (2012); F.
Scott Kieff, An Inconvenient School of Thought, 61 ALA. L. REV. 591 (2010); F. Scott Kieff, On Coordinating
Transactions in Intellectual Property: A Response to Smith’s Delineating Entitlements in Information, 117 YALE
L.J. POCKET PART 101 (2007); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1745, 1751–52 (2007); F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At
the Periphery of Intellectual Property, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 174 (2004); NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX & KENNETH L.
SOKOLOFF, Intermediaries in the U.S. Market for Technology, 1870–1920, in FINANCE, INTERMEDIARIES, AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 209, (Stanley L. Engerman et al. eds., 2003); and B. Zorina Khan & Kenneth L.
Sokoloff, History Lessons: The Early Development of Intellectual Property Institutions in the United States, 15 J.
ECON. PERSP. 233 (2001).
10
Abraham Lincoln, Second Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions (February 11, 1859), in 3 COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 356, 363 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (emphasis added and omitted).
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A commercialization approach to IP views IP more in the tradition of private law, as property
rights, by focusing on the use of IP in interactions between private parties, including contracts.
Centered on the relationships among private parties, this approach to IP emphasizes a different
target and a different mechanism by which IP can operate. Rather than target individuals who are
likely to respond to IP as incentives to create or invent in particular, this approach targets a
broad, diverse set of market actors in general. This large group encompasses the creator or
inventor as well as all those complementary users of a creation or an invention who can help
bring it to market, such as investors (including venture capitalists), entrepreneurs, managers,
marketers, developers, and owners of other key assets, tangible and intangible, including other
creations or inventions. Another key difference in this approach to IP lies in the mechanism by
which the IP assets and these private actors interact. This approach sees IP as a tool for
facilitating coordination among these diverse private actors, in furtherance of their own private
interests in commercializing the creation or invention.
This commercialization approach sees IP rights serving a role akin to “beacons in the dark,”
drawing to themselves potential complementary users of the IP-protected asset to interact with
the IP owner and each other, exploring through the bargaining process the possibility of striking
contracts with each other. Focusing on such a “beacon-and-bargain” effect can relieve the
governmental side of the IP system of the need to amass the detailed information required to
reasonably tailor a direct targeted incentive, such as each actor’s relative interests and
contributions, needs, skills, or the like. Not only is amassing all of that information hard for the
government to do, but large, established market actors may be better able than smaller market
entrants to wield the political influence needed to get the government to act, increasing risk of
concerns about political economy, public choice, and fairness. Instead, each private party can
bring its own expertise and other assets to the negotiating table while knowing—without
necessarily having to reveal it to other parties or the government—enough about its own level of
interest and capability when it decides whether to strike a deal or not.
Such successful coordination may help bring new business models, products, and services to
market. It also can allow IP owners and their contracting parties to appropriate the returns to any
of the rival inputs they invested towards developing and commercializing creations or
inventions—labor, lab space, capital, and the like. At the same time, the government can avoid
having to then go back to evaluate and trace the actual relative contributions that each participant
brought to a creation’s or an invention’s successful commercialization—including, again, the
cost of obtaining and using that information and the associated risks of political influence—by
enforcing the terms of the contracts these parties strike with each other to allocate any value
resulting from the creation’s or invention’s commercialization. In addition, significant economic
theory and empirical evidence suggest this can all happen while the quality-adjusted prices paid
by many end-users actually decline and public access is high. In keeping with this
commercialization approach, patents can be important antimonopoly devices, helping a smaller
“David” come to market and compete against a larger “Goliath.”11
11

Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., concurring).
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A commercialization approach thereby mitigates many of the challenges raised by the tension
that is the focus of the other intellectual approaches to IP, as well as by their responses to that
tension. Many of the alternatives to IP that are often suggested, such as rewards or tax credits,
can face significant challenges in facilitating the private-sector coordination benefits envisioned
by the commercialization approach. While such approaches often are motivated by concerns
about rising prices paid by consumers and direct benefits paid to creators and inventors, they
may not account for the important cases in which IP rights are associated with declines in
quality-adjusted prices paid by consumers and other forms of commercial benefits accrued to the
entire IP production team as well as to consumers and third parties, which are emphasized in a
commercialization approach. In addition, a commercialization approach can embrace many of
the practical checks on the market power of an IP right that are often suggested by other
approaches to IP, such as antitrust review, government takings, and compulsory licensing, while
at the same time showing the importance of maintaining self-limiting principles within each such
check to maintain commercialization benefits and mitigate concerns about dynamic efficiency,
public choice, fairness, and the like.12
To be sure, a focus on commercialization does not ignore creators or inventors or creations or
inventions themselves. For example, a system successful in commercializing inventions can have
the collateral benefit of providing positive incentives to those who do invent through the
possibility of sharing in the many rewards associated with successful commercialization. Nor
does a focus on commercialization guarantee that IP rights cause more help than harm in all
circumstances. Significant theoretical and empirical questions remain open about how the system
can be improved overall.
III. PROPERTY APPROACH IS ROOTED IN THE EARLY US PATENT SYSTEM
Governments in many countries have used patent systems since the Renaissance. The British
Empire used them like special monopolistic privileges given out by the Crown to its favorites.
And even the British started to rein in that approach. Our Founders knew about this history and
deliberately took a different approach. They thought it was so important to give Congress the
power to create a patent system that they included it in the unamended text of the original
Constitution. The early American patent system was designed carefully to work differently than
the British one in that it was [purposely restrained by facts] and not open to political discretion.
Economic historians credit those differences to the success of the early American patent system.
By the mid-1800s Charles Dickens was describing in his short story “A Poor Man’s Tale of a

12

While the details of the particular legal rules operating within these patent-checking legal systems of antitrust,
government takings, and compulsory licensing are beyond the scope of this short overview chapter, the
commercialization and property rights approach to patents that this chapter is exploring does leave ample room for
those patent-checking systems to operate. For more on the commercialization approach to the details of those
systems, see, e.g., Kieff & Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of Intellectual Property, supra note 9; and
Richard A. Epstein & F. Scott Kieff, Questioning the Frequency and Wisdom of Compulsory Licensing for
Pharmaceutical Patents, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 71 (2011).
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Patent” how the unending bureaucracy of the British patent system not only failed to bring new
inventions to market, it also left inventors—as he wrote— “quite wore out, patience and pocket.”
In modern debates about patent systems, there is really no need to speculate or invent new
arguments. We’ve tried many approaches and seen many results. There’s not much reason to
expect the unexpected here. The more the patent system fills up with bureaucratic steps and
administrative and policy discretion, the more they favor the large politically connected people
and businesses, and the more both innovation and competition suffer. But the more the patent
system turns on objective facts and clear and predictable rules, the more it increases the number
of new technologies brought to market, the ability for diverse consumers to access those
technologies, and the diversity in sizes among the businesses in the market. That system won’t
be against big business; but it won’t so favor big business that it’s against small and mediumsized businesses as well.13
So often in today’s debates about patents, people ask us to imagine the old men in wigs with
the technologies of the late 1700s and tell us that we have to update our patent system to deal
with the new technologies of today and tomorrow. But that’s where the genius of the American
patent system comes into play. Rather than decide who gets a patent based on politics and
fashion, we designed our patent system to turn on facts about the prior art and objective
questions like novelty. So we don’t need to update our patent system to deal with new
technologies because the only technologies that are patentable in our patent system are the ones
that are new.
A similar attempt to question the core value of patents by looking to history is by invoking
Thomas Jefferson’s skeptical take on patents. Not only was Jefferson a leading figure in early
American government in general, as a principal drafter of the Declaration of Independence, our
first Secretary of State, our second Vice President, and our third President, he also was an
inventor and ran our first patent office. Yet, when it came to broader views about patents, he
was quite skeptical about property rights in ideas, writing:
He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without
lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without
darkening me.
…
I know well the difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are
worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which
are not.14
13
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While this certainly makes the skeptical case for having a patent system at all, once a patent
system has been offered to inventors, the path dependency of their decision to abandon trade
secrecy and instead seek patent protection on the expectation that patents will enjoy predictable
enforcement as property rights leaves patentees especially vulnerable to holdup. Sticking with
Jefferson’s metaphor of a candle, it’s important to bear in mind that blowing out someone else’s
light doesn’t make yours brighter, it just darkens the scene for everyone.
IV. COMMERCIALIZATION IS HELPED BY OBJECTIVE ADJUDICATION
RATHER THAN POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION
Commercialization does not merely depend on the specific legal rules operating within the
substantive fields of IP and antitrust themselves. It also is meaningfully helped by objective
approaches to government decision-making and analysis more generally, such as those operating
withing the courts and agencies acting on the patent system. The ITC is a prime example of a
tribunal that can provide objective adjudication for patents; and its success in this area is neither
an accident nor hard to reproduce.
Much has been written about the vital need to have government agencies including those in
both the fields of IP and antitrust, conduct careful, scientific, fact-based, analysis and decisionmaking, that accounts for diverse views and perspectives.15 When the ITC celebrated its 100th
anniversary,16 it had occasion to remember the difficult task our Nation’s first Treasury
Secretary, Alexander Hamilton, had to manage when figuring out how to finance the operation of
our new central government while at the same time hopefully helping or at least mitigating the
harm to our then-fledgling domestic manufacturing industry.
For the first century of its existence, the federal government was financed essentially with
tariffs on imports. There was no income tax back then. It took until 1913 for the Sixteenth
Amendment to our Constitution to be ratified, giving the Federal Government the power to raise
revenue from sources internal to the country such as via a tax on income.
Tariffs on imports can raise money for a national government. But that will only work to the
extent that imported goods continue to flow into the country despite rising prices paid by
purchasers. Tariffs also can protect domestic industries, including the then-fledgling
manufacturing sector, from foreign competition in finished manufactured goods. But that will
only work so long as the tariffs don’t also cover imported inputs to domestic manufacturing
processes. Tariffs also can trigger reciprocal tariffs that can hamper exports. It can be tricky to
figure out the net impact of these several forces that point in opposite directions.
15
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Although sometimes seen as an attempt at protectionism, Hamilton’s effort brought a
scientific approach to bear on these questions led him to compile a “Report on the Subject of
Manufactures” as a study of this dynamic system and to offer more balanced recommended
policy actions informed by such as study.17 To be sure, Hamilton’s report was just an initial
effort; and the intense debates and problems surrounding the dynamic impact of tariffs continued
for about a century until, together with slavery, they brought our country to war with itself in the
Civil War.
By soon after the end of the Civil War, the confluence of two factors brought much needed
help. First was the evolution in the state of the art in economic science, including much better
understanding of how to gather data and analyze it. The second was the suggestion by Frank
Taussig, Chairman of the Economics Department at Harvard, for a new approach to a
government agency tasked in this area.18 That new agency model, attempted a few times after
the Civil War, eventually became the ITC. It has a few key structural characteristics that being
replete with checks and balances coerce behavior that is collaborative, independent, analytical,
and professional, while punishing prerogative. While many of the Bi-Partisan-Commissions in
the US Government are lead by an odd number of Presidentially-Nominated-and-SenateConfirmed Commissioners (usually five), the ITC is designed for deadlock with an even number:
6. While most of the other Commissions have a Chair who generally can serve until replaced by
the President, the ITC Chair is required to switch person and party every two years, among the
existing Commissioners. And, at the ITC, the Commissioner terms are longer than at many of
the other commissions, (nine years) and generally non-renewable, thereby further tamping down
incentives for responsiveness to pressure from politics and intellectual fashion. This unleashes
and empowers the vast talent of our several hundred staff of professional economists, industry
experts, and lawyers to do the sometimes unthinkable within organizations: call the shots like
they see them.
While the ITC is, like the federal courts, deliberately structured to be removed from the
political influence of only one political party, the Department of Commerce’s Patent Office,
which operates the post-grant cancellation procedures for patents, as well as the Department of
Justice’s Antitrust Division (DoJ), are ordinary Executive Branch agencies directly responsive to
the political leadership of the President. Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission, which also
conducts antitrust enforcement like the DoJ, is only somewhat less directly responsive to
political influence because it is structured as a five-member agency with a Chair appointable and
removable by the President, backed up by a majority in the President’s party.
In addition to important differences in how these tribunals are structured internally, there also
are important differences in how their basic substantive jurisdictional limits exacerbate the
incentives for party advocates to engage in hyperbolic arguments. While the ITC and the federal
courts have substantive power to simultaneously address issues relating to patent validity, patent
17
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infringement, remedy, and antitrust, the Patent Office, like the DoJ and FTC, do not. The Patent
Office can only assess patent validity; and the DoJ and the FTC can only assess antitrust. When
all four topics are in dispute within a single tribunal, each side of the case has powerful selfdisciplining effect to make arguments more grounded in the record. The patentee has the selfish
incentive when arguing about infringement and remedy to argue that the patent claims are broad
(thereby sweeping in more infringements), but it also has the countervailing selfish incentive
when arguing about validity and antitrust to assert that the patent claims are narrow (thereby
avoiding the prior art and avoiding excessive market power). At the same time the opposing
party has the exact opposite set of mutually countervailing incentives. As a result, each side
engages in self-restraint, providing the tribunal with a much more elaborate and thoughtfully
presented (less hyperbolic) set of evidence and arguments.
The combined effects of more internal independence and less hyperbolic arguments from
advocates, helps courts and the FTC reach more reasoned determinations that are more
transparently grounded in the record. Simply put, they enjoy the greater opportunity to be more
informed by more diverse opinion and perspective and they face more disciplining need to
ground their opinions in the public factual record.
One example of this politically diverse and independent approach of the ITC acting at the IPantitrust interface is the several views that emerged engaging the specific factual record of the
actual negotiating and litigation behavior of actual parties to an IP dispute in the Amkor v.
Carsem “encapsulated integrated circuits” case involving the standard setting organization called
“JEDEC.” In that case, four of the six Commissioners provided additional views exploring
various procedural safeguards akin to waiver and estoppel to maximize fairness and the ways
specific conduct of both the IP owner and the IP user can give rise to symmetrical concerns
about holdup and reverse holdup.19 Similar symmetrical concern for such procedural and
substantive nuances is elaborated in the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) Huawei v. ZTE
decision, which may suggest the emergence of an international norm, at least for those parts of a
government designed to operate more removed from the direct influence of only one political
party.20
V. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IS NOT THAT DIFFERENT
FROM TANGIBLE PROPERTY
With tangible property like land, a car, or a cell phone, the property right includes a right for
the owner to use thing covered by the property right. If you own land, a car, or a cell phone, you
can basically use it without needing permission from other people. The government likely will
regulate your use in many ways; but if the government so restricts your use that you can’t use it
19
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at all, then you probably have a claim against the government for just compensation due from
their taking.
With intangible property like IP, the main and basically only right that the owner gets is the
right to exclude other private people or businesses from infringing. That means that if the IP
owner can’t actually enforce that right to exclude, there’s not much incentive for infringers to
avoid infringement or to negotiate for a license or purchase of the IP. That’s why the right to
exclude is so important for IP.
With tangible property like land, a car, or a cell phone, everyone can easily tell if someone is
using it because you can see them on the land, in the car, or holding the phone. With intangible
property like a mortgage, a share of stock, a bond, or a patent, we have to read the detailed
written words to know what the thing is, what its boundaries are, and who is using it. The right to
exclude is the only way IP owners can easily keep track of who is using their IP and at the same
time easily interact with those users so that everyone can make informed choices about whether
to infringe, negotiate for a license or sale of the IP, or design around the IP to avoid
infringement.
For many forms of both tangible and intangible property, we can look to a government
registry to tell who owns it. Those registries are not perfect; and it can take real time to comb
through them to find what you might be looking to target or avoid. But much of that work gets
done by owners of those assets when they knock on your door or write you a letter and tell you
why you should consider taking a license under their patent or buying their patent. You surely
won’t take their word for it that you should; but you also know now what your lawyers should
read and consider before you decide to invest billions of dollars in a new product line that might
infringe some of those patents.
Users of patented technologies complain they are too often surprised to learn they are
infringers because patents can be hard to interpret. While some legal instruments are harder to
interpret than others, the legal rules for each kind of instrument set the standard. In many of the
patent cases that have made headlines over recent years—like eBay v. MercExchange, TiVO v.
Echostar, and i4i v. Microsoft,21 the patents were adjudicated to have fully met each of patent
law’s disclosure requirements—including enablement, written description, and definiteness.
While we should always consider the pluses and minuses of making objective disclosure rules
like these somehow more demanding on the patentee, there will always be a zone of uncertainty
between what a patent does and does not cover.
But however uncertain things may be in some settings, we shouldn’t forget that in eBay, TiVO
and i4i, the patent infringements were adjudicated to have been willful. That means the infringer
knew or should have known its conduct was wrong. It stretches the definition of surprise to reach
a case where a lawyer’s legal advice would have told—or did tell—the user of the patented
technology that its use would be adjudicated to be infringement.
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The intangible nature of patent rights is not a reason to allow parties willfully to ignore those
rights. Quite the opposite: it is the very reason society has predictable rules and reliable and
transparent procedures for the enforcement of those rights. Imagine you own an electronics shop
and come in one morning to find a broken window and some items strewn across the floor, but
it’s hard to tell exactly what has been stolen. At least with tangible property like phones or chips
or any physical goods in a shop you can count your inventory and see what was stolen. But, even
with a theft like this of physical goods, your insurance company will still require a report by the
police investigators verifying what’s been taken before they cut a check to cover the loss. With
intangible property like a patent, you also need a process to sort out the facts, and perhaps even
more so, because you might only imperfectly know exactly what a thief has taken. Patent
infringement suits help everyone in the market figure how many of each specific type of
inventory has been taken, whether the USPTO somehow made an error, and what remedies are
appropriate. That’s why patentees often go both to the court and the ITC at the same time. The
court has the full panoply of remedies in its tool belt, but takes much longer, usually several
years, to reach a judgment. The ITC has many fewer remedy tools in its toolbelt, but goes faster,
and carries out at least as full and fair an adjudication that helps everyone in the market get a full
and crisp picture of what actually has happened. It also happens to be the only venue in the US
patent system today where patentee who wins an adjudication of patent infringement has a
reasonable likelihood of securing an injunction-like remedy, which at the ITC would be either an
exclusion order to keep particular goods from being imported into the country or a cease and
desist order preventing particular parties from taking particular actions.
Several long-standing doctrines of tangible property offer important lessons about how
property rights in patents can accommodate the real apprehensions that implementers of patented
technologies may be truly surprised to learn they are infringers. Property law doctrines that
govern cases of a mistaken improver of another’s personal property or a mistaken building
encroachment on another’s real property operate to protect both the interest of the mistaken
infringer and the interests we all share in protecting property—including the interest of nonmistaken owners, second parties who may have invested in transacting with the owners, and nonmistaken third parties who may have invested in avoiding the property, such as by designing
around the patented technology. These property doctrines go far in vindicating the accidental
infringer’s hold up or hassle costs due mostly to path dependency (why tear down the big
building built an inch over the property line?). They also go far in vindicating the autonomy
interests (and emotional interests in expressing exasperation) of the property owner, second
parties who elected to transact with that owner, and third parties who paid to get better surveys
and design around that owner’s lot. The way property law meets those dual goals is not by
making the property interest invalid or unenforceable, merely because of “innocent”
infringement or evidence of “spite” in the suit. After all, aren’t we all allowed to reveal
emotional pique when our autonomy and financial interests are aroused due to the unilateral acts
of an infringer, however “innocent” or “accidental” the infringement? The way we meet those
dual goals when it comes to building encroachments and mistaken improvements is that we tailor
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the remedy.22 And of course the tailoring of the remedy to account for “spite” would include all
of the usual tools our legal system uses to police bad-faith litigation, including Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that even the pro-patent-Federal-Circuit showed it would use
against bad faith patentees who brought baseless litigation suits as in cases like Judin v. US,
which was even decided at a time when critics of a property rights approach to patents saw the
court as being too property rights oriented.23
Critics of patent enforcement in the context of 5G and IoT appeal for sympathy from policy
makers by emphasizing a number of putative concerns that all can easily be seen as red herrings
with one stylistic example of a native or indigenous American, who makes a product covered by
someone else’s patent while remaining entirely on land previously owned by indigenous
ancestors, with only materials she pulled from her ancestral ground, for only a very good reason
like saving a life, without copying or knowing about the patent. Under ordinary doctrines of
patent law that would be ordinary patent infringement. This remains the case regardless of
whether we emphasize that our indigenous user owns great title to the materials she is using, and
that she didn’t copy the patent or the inventor or even know about them. It also remains the case
regardless of whether we call for a search for some better claimant to the patent rights. We have
long followed a relativity of title approach to property having since Roman Law rejected across
property systems the so-called jus tertii defense that attempts to avoid liability for infringement
by asking the tribunal to hold off on enforcing a property right until an exhaustive search is
conducted to ensure there is no better owner willing to assert the right than the one now in
possession of the right and acting as a gate keeper to enforce it. Similarly, efforts to invoke
notions of a good faith purchaser for value also fall flat since the public recording of the patent in
the patent office negates the good faith of the infringement as it does with all recording systems
for property.
At the same time, shifting the balance back towards patent enforcement from antitrust
enforcement doesn’t eliminate antitrust enforcement. There remains plenty of room for ordinary
antitrust enforcement where there is actual other evidence—other than the mere presence of a
patent—of actual market power. There also remains plenty of room for antitrust action where
the patent was procured with knowing fraud as in Walker Process, or when the patent
enforcement is “a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere
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directly with the business relationships of a competitor” as in Handguards and is both
objectively baseless and subjectively motivated to cause harm to the market as in PRE.24
VI. RECENT U.S. PATENT SYSTEM INNOVATIONS
HARM MORE THAN HELP INNOVATION
The major changes to the patent system over the past two decades, some through Congress
and some through the courts, have harmed innovation, competition, and national security. They
have all operated to do basically two things: one is to drastically shift many of the specific legal
rules about patent validity, patent infringement, and patent transactions from generally turning on
objective facts applicable the same way to everyone to generally turning on subjective discretion
finely tailored to each different user; and the second is to drastically add to the number and
strength of administrative and bureaucratic procedures available to keep a patent from being
enforced in court or at the ITC.25 It’s as if we read Dickens’s story “A Poor Man’s Tale of a
Patent” and decided that the tragic caricature of a broken patent system that he was telling
everyone to avoid was something we should actually seek out and put into place.
Whenever a commercial law system is so finely adapted to policy preferences of politically
motivated government actors and subjectively tailored by them to each different use and user, the
only kinds of businesses that can engage that system are the huge politically powerful ones.
Property rights are at their worst when they are created and changed and erased at the discretion
of the government, and when private actors have to include the government in every decision
about whether to bundle, divide, or license or sell the property rights. That kind of system forces
market actors to constantly deal with the government, and that always favors big players with
more political power. That just concentrates wealth and power.
When a property rights system is working well, the rules of the game are predictable,
applicable to everyone, and private actors are generally given broad flexibility to bundle or
divide and license and sell the property rights among themselves. That kind of system forces
market actors to constantly deal with each other. That drives competition, innovation, economic
growth, and jobs.
So, what are some principal reasons that large companies might like a patent system chocked
full of weak patents? The big picture is that large firms have other ways to earn rents than
relying on strong patents and many ways that rely on weak patents. But little firms have vital
need for strong patents and little use for weak patents.
Think about how a regulator in a field like antitrust, consumer safety, environment, or food
and drug has to operate. Consider a BigCo who finds itself losing a case brought by the
regulator (such as IBM or Xerox in the famous antitrust cases of the 1970s). Won’t the BigCo
24
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just ask the regulator “since we can all agree that regardless of historical behavior, as we’ll all
move forward together, surely it would be good for society if we were to provide not just
ongoing products and services, but even better ones that are innovative….?” And wouldn’t the
regulator quickly agree? After all, that regulator gets to notch a win on its belt to successfully
conclude another enforcement action and at the same time preserve an operating American
Business that employs workers, sells to consumers, and is not committed to inventing for the
future! But how will that the regulator and the regulated agree on how to price all that new
stuff? That’s where all those weak patents come into play. How about counting patents? But
will anyone be enforcing those patents in court or at the ITC? (Not likely) Is the regulator expert
on patents, or aware of the prior art or how to design around infringement? Not if their expertise
is in antitrust, consumer safety, environment, or food & drug administration.
The BigCos also love a weak patent system full of lots of patents because it helps them
manage each other. If the CEOs of two BigCos pick up the phone to talk to each other on a
private call about how to split up their market they face two serious problems. One is antitrust.
That’s a criminal antitrust violation that sends both CEOs to jail and punishes the shareholders of
both BigCos with treble damages. The second is trust. Why will the two CEOs trust each other?
But a patent system full of lots of weak patents solves both the antitrust and trust problems for
the BigCos. The antitrust problem is solved because now they can communicate with each other
through tons of patent lawsuits. Did you ever wonder why so many BigCos complain so loudly
about how long and expensive patent litigation can be? That’s in part a legitimate complaint.
But serious process takes serious time and money, and the complaints are partially to distract you
from the benefits the BigCos get. A big part of the BigCo antitrust benefit is that the terabytes of
data they are exchanging in litigation discovery and the onerous on-the-record sworn depositions
of engineers, accountants, and managers, come together to form a high-bandwidth, high-fidelity,
multi-year communication channel that is happening right in front of—and often as ordered by—
Federal judges. So, when many of those cases settle, if the antitrust regulators don’t like it and
ask for a structural redesign, at least there’s no jail time or treble damages from what would
otherwise have been a private phone call. And all of that also solves the trust problem, because
all of those communications lasting years across multiple employees are then all backed up by a
final settlement, where some ground is held and some ground is conceded, confirming true
overall interest.
And there’s one more reason BigCos love a patent system full of lots of weak patents. The
Goliaths can then be sure no Davids will show up with a fatal sling shot.
It is so tempting to think that intellectual property is just about money and that money
damages, or maybe even tax credits or other direct targeted incentives are all that is needed.
Why gum up the works of the market with so many injunctions?
The better question is to ask why it’s best to have the government figure out everyone’s
relative contribution, or merit, and trace it all the way through a complex commercialization
process, and then pay each person her due, which presumably is just enough to entice them away
from their other options to do each specific step, and no more and nothing else.
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This ardent search for scientific evidence of the true value of an infringed patent is what
unfortunately led even the distinguished Judge Posner to strike the economics experts of both
sides of a patent case from offering damages testimony because he viewed them as insufficiently
grounded in scientific evidence or historical fact.26 But where an infringer has decided to
infringe rather than buy title or license to the patent, we also know the search for historical or
scientific evidence of what price would have met the needs of both a willing buyer and a willing
seller is entirely fictional. It will always be a frustrating search for scientific and historical fact
when the specific topic has already been demonstrated to be a figment of imagination.
Commercializing innovative, creative, and distinctive goods and services requires a ton of
coordination among a ton of private actors spread out across the marketplace. We are talking
about much more than inventing or creating. We are talking about bringing it all the way to
market. That takes a complex dance among inventors or creators, entrepreneurs, venture
capitalists, managers, manufacturers, marketers, distributors, and owners of other key assets,
tangible and intangible, including other creations or inventions.
When IP is governed by a predictably enforced set of rules and backed up by a right to
exclude rather than a mere right to some payment, it stands like a beacon in the dark, drawing to
itself all of those many different actors in the commercialization process. They can decide on
their own to strike whatever deals with each other that they like, or not, and to practice the IP
subject matter or design around. The government then needs to merely enforce whatever deals
they strike. No player needs to reveal to any other player or to the government what outside
options it is considering, or what internal economics it faces. That keeps the government far
away from the need to do any fine-grained analysis of the specific merit and incentives that may
have been best tailored to each step in the long and complex process of commercialization. The
government doesn’t need to trace contributions or allocate values. All the government has to do
is enforce any valid IP rights to exclude, and any contractual rights to payment negotiated by the
parties on their own terms.
Justice Thomas is correct that a public right like a public franchise to build a toll bridge is
something that requires intense scrutiny.27 He’s also correct that the patent system that has
evolved over the past twenty years is way too far in that same direction. But of course, that’s
just one more reason to steer course back to the patent system we had in the 1980s and 1990s.
That was a patent system that brought us a massive increase in the number of new
pharmaceuticals and new medical devices brought to market, while at the same time supporting
both large pharmaceutical companies as well as a large pool of small and medium sized
biotechnology companies.
Notice also that the US patent system of the 1980s and 1990s was the product of both political
parties in the US. It also was unique to the US. While many of the people and inventions and
companies were located in Europe or Japan, only the patent system in the US was operating so
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strongly at that time and that strong US patent system supported commercialization and
competition for the world. It even supported the lesser developed countries of the world. As
those countries started to enforce these biopharma patents the same way as in the US,
distribution into areas of high poverty actually increased immensely while prices in those
poverty-stricken areas did not increase beyond the small amounts associated with local
regulation and distribution.28
CONCLUSION
Today’s technology and business professionals working to bring to market all the great
promise of 5G and IoT are making an amazing contribution to our society today and tomorrow.
Today’s legal and policy professionals wrestling on all sides of the debates about the patentantitrust interface raise great questions, in good faith, with the shared goal of fostering a better
and more diverse and more inclusive society for us all, today and tomorrow, fostered by
innovation and competition. While the debates are of the moment, they are also echoes of those
long waged at least across the past century and a half. A prudent policy maker of today can save
a great deal of time, effort, and unintended consequences for all, by bearing in mind the ideas
explored here, that are extracted from those historical debates and that have enjoyed great
support from leaders across our domestic political spectrum.

28

US International Trade Commission, Economics Impact of Trade Agreements Implemented Under Trade
Authorities Procedures, 2016 Report at 80, (Publication Number: 4614, Investigation Number: 332-555, June 2016),
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4614.pdf (citing Mark Duggan et al., The Market Impacts of
Pharmaceutical Product Patents in Developing Countries: Evidence from India, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 99 (2016)
(“2005 implementation of patent protection for pharmaceutical products in India increased average prices only
slightly, and also had little impact on quantities”).

19

